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561 
THE CFTC’S ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE SPECULATIVE 
POSITION LIMITS ON OFF-EXCHANGE SWAP CONTRACTS 




The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) is 
once again seeking to enact sweeping mandatory position limits, in-
tended to curb what it regards as “excessive speculation” in privately 
negotiated swaps, involving twenty-eight different physical commod-
ities that are traded on United States designated futures markets.1 
The CFTC claims that the authority to do this is based on 
amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act that were adopted as 
part of the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 
(“Dodd- Frank”).2 
The twenty-eight commodities that would be subject to off-
exchange position limits include Comex copper, silver and gold, 
NYMEX gasoline, low sulfur diesel, light sweet crude, natural gas, 
platinum and palladium, and a variety of agricultural products traded 
on the Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 
and ICE Futures U.S. (cocoa, coffee, orange juice). 
Excluded from the proposal are position limits for swaps in 
physical commodities other than the twenty-eight commodities spe-
cifically identified, as well as swaps in non-physical commodities, 
such as interest rates, foreign exchange, and commodity indices.3 
 
 Mr. Bernstein is a partner in the law firm of Eaton & Van Winkle LLP in Manhattan.  He 
recently represented U.S. copper fabricators opposed to the launch of new exchange traded 
funds backed by physical copper.  The proposals have since been withdrawn. 
1 Position Limits for Derivatives, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N 95 (proposed 
Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/federalre 
gister110513c.pdf (last visited May 2, 2014).  This proposal was published in the Federal 
Register on Nov. 15, 2013. 
2 15 U.S.C § 8302 (2010). 
3 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 18 n.49.  As proposed, it would appear 
that swaps denominated in contracts traded in the United States on foreign boards of trade, 
such as the London Metal Exchange, where most metal futures in the United States are actu-
1
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A position limit caps the maximum number of derivative con-
tracts to purchase (long) or sell (short) that an individual trader or 
group of traders may own during a given period.4  The proposed lim-
its would cap the number of such contracts a trader may hold in both 
the spot month, which is a specific period of time that immediately 
precedes the date of delivery of the commodity under the derivatives 
contract and in non-spot months, by capping the total number of con-
tracts that expire in periods further in the future or in all months 
combined.5 
Here, the CFTC is proposing that position limits in the spot 
month for each such commodity should generally be limited to 25% 
of the estimated deliverable supply of that commodity, which is de-
fined as the amount of such physical commodity that can reasonably 
be expected to be available to accommodate a short seller needing to 
make physical delivery.6  That would include the amount of such 
physical commodity actually stored in any exchange warehouse des-
ignated for such delivery, plus anything else that could reasonably be 
expected to arrive in time to meet a delivery obligation that month.7 
In the non-spot months, the CFTC is proposing to limit the 
 
ally traded, would be exempt from CFTC position limits.  The LME operates without posi-
tion limits.  It, therefore, follows that one of the unintended consequences of the CFTC pro-
posal may be to give competing exchanges that operate in the United States as foreign 
boards of trade a competitive advantage over their Unites States competitors by ensuring 
their futures markets operate with far greater liquidity.  In recognition of this possibility, 
Dodd-Frank says the CFTC “shall strive to ensure that trading on foreign boards of trade in 
the same commodity will be subject to comparable limits and that any limits to be imposed 
by the Commission will not cause price discovery in the commodity to shift to trading on the 
foreign boards of trade.”  7 U.S.C. § 6a(2)(C).  The CFTC does not appear to have addressed 
the issue at this time. 
 However, efforts are underway in the European Union to adopt comparable position lim-
its to curb so-called “excessive speculation.”  In January 2014, the European Parliament ap-
proved the concept of position limits, but the determination of what those limits will be, 
what underlying products will be covered, whether such limits will be applicable to off-
exchange as well as exchange-traded derivatives, and what exemptions will be available for 
hedging purposes, are all still to be negotiated, and there is no assurance such regulations 
will be applicable or acceptable by all countries in the European Union, including in particu-
lar in the United Kingdom.  Jim Brunsden, EU Reins In High-Frequency Traders to Com-
modity Speculators, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2014, 10:09 AM), http://washpost.bloomberg.com 
/Story?docId=1376-MZEW996K50YR01-18HPPOQQOIB6AK99QAVN6G50NS. 
4 17 C.F.R. § 150.2 (2012). 
5 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 301-02.  
6 CME GROUP, CONDITIONAL SPOT-MONTH SPECULATIVE LIMIT PROPOSAL (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmissio 
n_080211_964_0.pdf. 
7 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 170-71. 
2
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number of contracts a speculator may acquire in a single month, or in 
the aggregate, to 2.5% of the open interest in such contracts up to the 
first 25,000 contracts and 1.2% of the excess above 25,000 contracts.8 
The first question one might well ask is whether sweeping 
new rules to combat off-exchange “excessive speculation” are even 
needed.  There were numerous events that led to the economic crisis 
in 2008 and subsequent passage of the Dodd Frank Act,9 but on or 
off-exchange “excessive speculation” in commodities is not usually 
identified as one of them.10 
The next question is whether these new rules are likely to 
withstand judicial review if, as the CFTC maintains in its latest public 
filing, there is no obligation to demonstrate that these new rules are 
even necessary much less demonstrate through any quantitative anal-
ysis that their putative benefits outweigh the costs.11 
Thus, the Commission stated in its latest notice that “it is rea-
sonable to conclude from the Dodd-Frank amendments that Congress 
mandated limits and did not intend for the Commission to make a ne-
cessity finding as a prerequisite to the imposition of limits.”12 
At issue here is the entire concept in the United States of “ex-
cessive speculation.”13  Those who favor imposing these sweeping 
new position limits believe, as a matter of faith, that “excess” specu-
lation in futures markets artificially inflates prices for the physical 
commodities underlying those trades, thereby burdening interstate 
commerce in the United States.14  They point to examples in history 
 
8 Id. at 178. 
9 YU GAO ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE DODD FRANK ACT OF 2010: EVIDENCE 
FROM MARKET REACTIONS TO EVENTS SURROUNDING THE PASSAGE OF THE ACT 6-7 (2011), 
available at http://business.rice.edu/uploadedFiles/Faculty_and_Research/Academic_Areas/ 
Accounting/papers/Wang_Paper.pdf. 
10 Id. at 14. 
11 Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading, 79 Fed. Reg. 5808, 5813 (Jan. 31, 
2014). 
12 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 11; id. at 21-22 (“Because of this man-
date, the Commission need not make a prerequisite finding that such limits are necessary ‘to 
diminish, eliminate or prevent excessive speculation causing sudden or unreasonable fluctua-
tions or unwarranted changes in the prices of’ commodities under pre-Dodd Frank CEA sec-
tion 4a(a)(1).”). 
13 7 U.S.C. § 6a (2010).  The same can be said of the concept in Europe, which, like the 
United States, is also proposing position limits to combat “excessive speculation.” 
14 CME GROUP, EXCESSIVE SPECULATION AND POSITION LIMITS IN ENERGY DERIVATIVES 
MARKETS 1, 9 (2013), available at http://www.cmegroup.com/company/files/PositionLimits 
WhitePaper.pdf. 
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where this supposedly occurred.15  The theory is that excessive specu-
lation may result in the concentration of ownership of “open interest” 
in spot and more thinly-traded future delivery months which could 
give one or more of such dominant traders in such contract markets 
the ability to keep prices artificially high by outbidding other market 
participants whose trading might result in prices that more accurately 
reflect the actual supply and demand of the underlying commodity.16 
By contrast, those opposed to the new limits believe there is 
no such thing as “excessive speculation” in futures markets because 
for every speculator who bets aggressively that prices are going up, 
there must be other speculators willing to take the opposite bet.17  
Thus, absent concerted activity among competing speculators, which 
is already illegal under United States commodity and antitrust laws,18 
non-collusive “excessive speculation”—however the government de-
fines it—cannot alter the fundamental laws of supply and demand 
which actually dictate the price of underlying physical commodities, 
no matter how much “excess” speculation may take place in a given 
contract market.19  Thus, to their way of thinking, “excessive specula-
tion” not only cannot cause artificially inflated prices, it defies logic 
and common sense even to think that it might. 
Furthermore, as far as history is concerned, any so-called in-
cidents of “excessive speculation” involving concerted activity 
among competing speculators are already illegal and do not need po-
sition limits to police in any event because conspirators would evade 
them.20  Alternatively, they involved actions by a single speculator 
whose aggressive trading, either going too long or too short, are 
matched by equally aggressive trading on the other side.21  This is 
consistent with what efficient markets are supposed to do; effectively 
tame any artificially inflated prices which again, are determined not 
by speculators betting too much one way or the other, but by the rela-
 
15 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 32-34. 
16 Id. at 34. 
17 FIA Letter to Commodities Futures Trading Commission (Feb. 7, 2014), at 11, availa-
ble at http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/FIA_Position_Limits_Comment_Letter_02 
0714.pdf. 
18 Id. at attachment A. 
19 Id. at 2. 
20 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
is declared to be illegal.”); see 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a)(1). 
21 See infra note 74, p. 114 and Part IV. 
4
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tive balance of supply and demand of the underlying physical com-
modity.22 
The CFTC’s sweeping new proposal was announced on No-
vember 15, 2013 in a notice of proposed rulemaking.23  Final com-
ments on the proposal were due January 14, 2014, and the CFTC will 
announce its Final Decision in the coming weeks.24  As this article 
will demonstrate, however, the legality of the CFTC’s bold move in 
this direction is not free from doubt, and should the CFTC again 
stumble, efforts to impose position limits in Europe, which appears 
critical to the success of the United States effort, may suffer a similar 
fate. 
I. CFTC RULEMAKING REFLECTS SECOND ATTEMPT TO 
ESTABLISH POSITION LIMITS 
This is the second time the CFTC is trying to get these posi-
tion limits enacted25 and it is a virtual certainty that the legality of 
these new rules will be challenged in legal proceedings that may 
eventually reach the United States Supreme Court. 
The CFTC’s first effort ended in failure after two trade 
groups, the International Swap Dealers Association and the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association, successfully challenged 
the rules in federal district court in Washington.26 
The heart of their challenge was that the CFTC misinterpreted 
its statutory authority under the CEA, as amended by Dodd-Frank.27  
The district court opinion, by Judge Robert L. Wilkins, an Obama 
appointee who was one of the president’s three successful nominees 
to the D.C. Court of Appeals that Republican senators tried so hard 
last fall to block, is startling in its recitation of facts showing that not 
even members of the CFTC were confident that these sweeping new 
 
22 How Supply and Demand Determine Commodities Market Prices, 
TRADINGCHARTS.COM, http://futures.tradingcharts.com/learning/supply_and_demand.html 
(last visited May 2, 2014). 
23 Proposed Rules, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://comments.cftc.go 
v/FederalRegister/Proposed.aspx?Type=ListAll&Year=2013 (last visited May 2, 2014). 
24 Id. 
25 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 9-10.  
26 See Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. United States Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d 259 (D.D.C. 2012). 
27 Id. at 279-80. 
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position limits were necessary or warranted.28 
Thus, before vacating the CFTC’s first attempt to impose the-
se position limits, Judge Wilkins noted that the rules were originally 
adopted by the agency on October 18, 2011 by a three-to-two vote 
and that one of those voting in favor, along with Chairman Gary 
Gensler and Commissioner Bart Chilton, was Commissioner Michael 
V. Dunn, who admitted several months before, when the proposed 
rules were still pending, that “to date CFTC staff has been unable to 
find any reliable economic analysis to support either the contention 
that excessive speculation is affecting the market we regulate or that 
position limits will prevent excessive speculation.”29  The opinion 
further notes that “Dunn also shared his ‘fear’ that ‘at best position 
limits are a cure for a disease that does not exist, or at worst it’s a 
placebo for one that does,’ ” adding that “position limits may harm 
the very markets we’re intended to protect.”30 
The court focused on Dunn’s views because, as the deciding 
vote in favor of the new rules, Dunn’s quandary was not unlike the 
court’s.  Thus, Dunn voted in favor of the rule not because he be-
lieved they made sense or were grounded in empirical evidence 
demonstrating their necessity, but because he believed Congress had 
required them to do it.31 
Position limits are, in my opinion, a sideshow that has 
unnecessarily diverted human and fiscal resources 
away from actions to prevent another financial crisis.  
To be clear, no one has proven that the looming spec-
ter of excessive speculation in the futures market re-
regulated even exist, let alone played any role whatso-
ever in the financial crisis of 2008.  Even so, Congress 
has tasked the CFTC with preventing excessive specu-
lation by imposing position limits.  This is the law.  
The law is clear and I will follow the law.32 
Even Chairman Gensler was defensive, saying that the final 
rule reflected the Commission’s view that it was compelled to pro-
duce a certain result: “Congress did not give the Commission a 
 
28 Id. at 281-82. 
29 Id. at 262. 
30 Id. at 262-63. 
31 Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 264. 
32 Id. at 263-64 (emphasis added). 
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choice.  Congress directed the Commission to impose position limits 
and to do so expeditiously.”33 
Not surprisingly, the two dissenting commissioners, each of 
whom published written dissents, were less kind.  Commissioner 
Sommers warned that the rule “would inflict the greatest harm on bo-
na fide hedgers and ‘ironically’ may ‘result in increased food and en-
ergy costs for consumers,’ ” adding that the CFTC had “created a 
very complicated regulation that has the potential to irreparably harm 
these vital markets,” while setting the agency up “for an enormous 
failure.”34 
For his part, Commissioner O’Malia criticized the agency’s 
reading of the Dodd Frank amendments to the CEA, insisting that in 
the context of the Act, the CFTC’s discretion is “broad enough to 
permit the Commission to not impose limits if they are not appropri-
ate” and that the CFTC had “miss[ed] an opportunity to determine 
and define the type and extent of speculation that is likely to cause 
sudden, unreasonable and/or unwarranted commodity price move-
ments so that it can respond with rules that are reasonable and appro-
priate.”35  “O’Malia also faulted the Commission for promulgating 
position limits without any evidence that such limits would actually 
benefit the market.”36 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS 
Faced with diametrically opposed views as to whether Con-
gress actually mandated position limits without regard to whether the 
agency charged with enforcing them felt they were needed, the Court 
employed the Supreme Court’s two-part Chevron test.37 
Under step one of Chevron, the Court first must consider 
 
33 Id. at 264. 
34 Id.  Under the proposed new regulations, bona fide hedgers are expected to apply for 
and receive hedge exemptions.  However, the concern is that hedgers might not qualify for 
or receive in a timely manner all of the exemptions they may need which, were that to occur, 
would create a market in which already-issued hedge exemptions are themselves traded, with 
those who don’t need them selling them at a premium to those who do, with the added costs 
then passed on to consumers.  In exchange markets where position limits and hedge exemp-
tions are already commonplace, such trading already takes place. 
35 Id. 
36 Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 264. 
37 See Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 
(testing whether congressional language directly addresses a regulatory issue, under de novo 
review, and then assessing an agency’s construction of the statute if an ambiguity is present). 
7
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whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue 
because, if so, the Court and the agency “must give effect to the un-
ambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”38  “Under Chevron Step 
One, the Court examines the statute de novo, employing traditional 
tools of statutory construction” to “search for the plain meaning of 
the statute.”39 
If the statute is found to be “silent or ambiguous,” the Court 
moves on to Chevron step two and defers to the agency’s interpreta-
tion if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute.40 
Here, Judge Wilkins began with Section 6a(a)(1) of the CEA, 
which was amended by Dodd-Frank to broaden its scope to include 
not just exchange-traded futures, but off-exchange swaps that “per-
form[] a significant price discovery function.”41  Section 6a(a)(1) of 
the CEA has been a part of United States law in one form or another 
since 1936, when the idea of requiring position limits to combat “ex-
cessive speculation” in futures markets first arose.42 
That provision, the court said, unambiguously requires the 
Commission to find that position limits are necessary prior to impos-
ing them.43  Thus, Section 6a(a)(1) states in pertinent part: 
For the purpose of diminishing, eliminating, or 
preventing such burden [on interstate commerce 
caused by excessive speculation], the Commission 
shall, from time to time, after due notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing, by rule, regulation, or order, pro-
claim and fix such limits on the amounts of trading 
which may be done or positions which may be held by 
any person . . . as the Commission finds are necessary 
to diminish, eliminate, or prevent such burden.44 
Based on this language, Judge Wilkins held that the CEA re-
quires the CFTC to make a finding of necessity prior to imposing po-
sition limits, which it did not do, and is not doing now.45  So why did 
 
38 Id. at 842-43. 
39 Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 268. 
40 Id. at 280. 
41 Id. at 269. 
42 Id. at 269-70. 
43 Id. at 269. 
44 Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 6a (a)(1) 
(2010)) (emphasis added). 
45 Id. at 270. 
8
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that not end the matter?  The answer is that the CFTC and many 
Democrats in Congress believe other Dodd Frank amendments to the 
CEA effectively eliminated the necessity requirement.46 
First the agency points to Section 6a(a)(2), which states that 
“[i]n accordance with the standards set forth in paragraph (1) of this 
subsection . . . the Commission shall by rule,  regulation, or order es-
tablish limits on the amount of positions . . . .”47  However, because 
Congress incorporated by reference the term “standards” in the im-
mediately preceding paragraph, Judge Wilkins held that the term 
“standards”, which is nowhere mentioned expressly in paragraph 1, 
could either refer to the threshold requirement that the agency must 
first find position limits to be “necessary” or it could refer to some 
other standards.48  Hence the statute was ambiguous.  Because the 
agency didn’t bother to “interpret” the ambiguity, as required by 
Chevron part two, the Court had no choice but to issue an order va-
cating the rules, which it did.49 
Judge Wilkins also found other ambiguities in Dodd Frank’s 
amendments to the CEA.  Section 6a(a)(2)(A) not only directed the 
CFTC to establish position limits in accordance with the unspecified 
“standards” in subparagraph 1, which may or may not refer to the 
need to determine whether such limits are even necessary, but it also 
directed the CFTC to establish such position limits “as appropriate.”50  
The “as appropriate” language also appears in Section 6a(a)(3), 
which deals with fixing position limits in both the spot month and for 
all months combined, and in Section 6a(a)(5)(A), which states gener-
ally that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this section, the 
Commission shall establish limits on the amount of positions, includ-
ing aggregate position limits, as appropriate . . . .”51 
Here, too, the court found the “as appropriate” language to be 
ambiguous.52  Thus, in the absence of any language expressly repeal-
ing the requirement from 1936 that position limits must first be prem-
ised on a finding of necessity, which Congress could easily have done 
but chose not to do when it passed Dodd Frank in 2010, it was un-
 
46 Id. at 263. 
47 Id. at 274 (emphasis added). 
48 Id. at 275. 
49 Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 275. 
50 Id. at 278. 
51 Id. at 276 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 6a (a)(5)(A)) (emphasis added). 
52 Id. at 276. 
9
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clear whether the language in subsequent sections mandating position 
limits in accordance with prior “standards” and “as appropriate” was 
intended to jettison the requirement for a necessity finding or whether 
these words were intended to mean something else.53  In accordance 
with Chevron part two, in the absence of any interpretation from the 
agency to review, the court had no choice to but vacate.54 
While the court’s ruling was pending, the CFTC announced 
its intention to withdraw the rules and replace them with a new pro-
posal.55  By taking that step, the CFTC effectively prevented Judge 
Wilkins from going any further in his ruling and determining whether 
the rules then under challenge were arbitrary and capricious. 
However, Judge Wilkins made clear that in construing the 
statute, he is required to construe the statute as a whole, including the 
provision requiring a finding of necessity before position limits are 
established, and that the CFTC’s efforts to find mandatory language 
compelling the adoption of position limits in certain sections, without 
also taking into account the just-as-lawful opposite mandate in the 
section of the CEA dating back to 1936 which required a showing of 
necessity, would be unavailing.56 
The court also warned the CFTC that its attempt to satisfy 
Chevron part two would be entitled to no deference if, in conducting 
its analysis of the apparent ambiguities in the CEA as a result of the 
Dodd Frank amendments, it appeared the agency continued to believe 
that the mandate to establish position limits without a finding of ne-
cessity was clear and unambiguous.57 
Significantly, in light of the partisan political acrimony be-
tween Congressional Democrats and Republicans that followed pas-
sage of Dodd Frank, as well as the controversy surrounding Judge 
Wilkins’ recent Senate confirmation to serve on the appeals court,58 it 
 
53 Id. at 277-78. 
54 Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 278. 
55 Michael R. Sorrell et al., CFTC Proposes Speculative Position Limits Again, MONDAQ 
(Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/276994/Commodities+Derivative 
s+Stock+Exchanges/CFTC+Proposes+Speculative+Position+Limits+Again. 
56 “Although the CFTC is correct that these provisions taken in isolation seemingly create 
a mandatory regime, the agency and this Court is required to attempt to give effect to all 
parts of the statute, including the ambiguous language.”  Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 
887 F. Supp. 2d at 279. 
57 Id. at 280-81. 
58 Michael R. Crittenden, Senate Confirms Judge Wilkins to Key Federal Appeals Court, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303819 
704579319153037797452. 
10
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is worth noting that Judge Wilkins flatly rejected the views filed in 
amici briefs by the House Democratic Conference Committee, and by 
nineteen United States Senators, respectively.59 
III. THE CFTC’S NOVEMBER 15, 2013 PROPOSAL 
In its proposed new rules, the CFTC spends considerable ef-
fort addressing the issues raised by Judge Wilkins.  First, the agency 
purports to interpret the ambiguities identified by Judge Wilkins in 
the CEA, as amended by Dodd Frank, and not surprisingly concludes 
that, based on its knowledge and experience as the agency charged 
with enforcing position limits, Congress really did mandate off-
exchange position limits without any finding of necessity.60  Alterna-
tively, in the event the court rejects the CFTC’s analysis, the CFTC 
includes for the first time a necessity finding.61 
As indicated, final comments on the CFTC’s notice of pro-
posed rulemaking were due February 10, 2014.62  After reviewing the 
comments, the CFTC will issue its final rule, which will almost cer-
tainly be challenged, perhaps by the same parties as the last time and 
perhaps others.63  Assuming the CFTC still insists on pushing ahead 
with the limits, and there is every indication that it will, it is by no 
means clear that the CFTC will prevail. 
Specifically, the CFTC stated on November 15, 2013, “based 
on its experience and expertise, when [the positions limits section of 
the CEA] is considered as an integrated whole, it is reasonable to 
construe that section to mandate that the Commission impose posi-
tion limits” on futures contracts, options, and certain swaps for all 
twenty-eight physical commodities, and “[t]he Commission also con-
clude[d] that the mandate requires it to impose such limits without 
first finding that any such limit is necessary to prevent excessive 
speculation in a particular market.”64 
However, nowhere in its analysis did the CFTC really do 
what Judge Wilkins had asked, which was to square on one hand the 
 
59 Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 282-83. 
60 See generally Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 9-13. 
61 Id. at 21-22.  
62 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://comments.cftc.gov/FederalRegist 
er/Proposed.aspx?Type=ListAll&Year=2013 (last visited May 2, 2014). 
63 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 93, 113-14. 
64 Id. at 9. 
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clear and unambiguous mandate in the CEA, dating back to 1936 re-
quiring the CFTC to determine that position limits in specific contract 
markets are actually needed before ordering them, with the more am-
biguous Dodd Frank language added to the CEA requiring that the 
CFTC impose position limits in accordance with certain unspecified 
“standards” that must be met before position limits may be imposed, 
and the further ambiguous requirement in several subsections that 
such new position limits be imposed “as necessary.”65 
Instead, the CFTC concluded that because the Dodd Frank 
amendments called for new position limits to be implemented rela-
tively quickly, i.e., within 180 days from enactment of Dodd Frank 
for metals and energy and within 270 days from enactment for agri-
cultural products, Congress “did not intend for the Commission to 
make a necessity finding as a prerequisite to the imposition of limits” 
because there wouldn’t be enough time to make the required findings 
in each of the twenty-eight physical commodities covered.66 
Besides, the CFTC said, Congress did its own studies.67  Here, 
the CFTC cited work done several years before by staff members 
working for the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.68  
These reports, the CFTC said, “concluded that excessive speculation 
accounted for significant volatility and price increases in physical 
commodity markets.”69 
In fact, there were only two such investigations.  The first, 
conducted in 2006, dealt with increases in the price of crude oil, in 
which subcommittee staff found evidence suggesting that speculation 
was responsible for an increase of as much as $20-25 per barrel of 
crude oil, which was then at $70.70  The theory was that speculators 
were driving up the price of crude oil for future delivery and that oil 
 
65 Id. at 11. 
66 Id. at 10-11. 
67 Id. at 11-12. 
68 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 12 nn.23-25.  In his opening remarks 
on November 5, 2013, the day the CFTC approved the “revised” form of position limits, 
Chairman Gensler praised the work done for the agency by its former general counsel, Dan 
Berkovitz.  Prior to joining the CFTC as general counsel, Mr. Berkovitz worked for the Sen-
ate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations where he was responsible for the work staff 
members did on excessive speculation.  Id. at 522-23. 
69 Id. at 11. 
70 PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, THE ROLE OF MARKET SPECULATION IN 
RISING OIL & GAS PRICES: A NEED TO PUT THE COP BACK ON THE BEAT, S. REP. NO. 109-65, 
at 2 (2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT28640/pdf/CPRT-
109SPRT28640.pdf. 
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producers, in an effort to cash in on the speculative bonanza for them 
in the futures market, hoarded their oil so as to create an artificial 
shortage and take advantage of the higher prices.71 
There are several problems with this analysis.  First, it as-
sumes that all competing oil producers act like the oil cartel OPEC.  
But, there is in fact no evidence that competing oil producing compa-
nies are members of a cartel and would, as cartel members, willingly 
withhold oil from the market and forego immediate profits in the 
hope of getting even higher profits down the road.  However, absent 
such collusion among competing oil producing companies, which 
would be illegal, it would be very difficult and expensive for individ-
ual competitors to withhold oil or oil products from the market in the 
hope of driving up the price.72 Even if they wanted to withhold their 
product from the market, the ability of oil producers to store crude oil 
once removed from the ground is limited.  Oil, once pumped out of 
the ground, is generally transported to oil refineries around the world.  
Thus, assuming no actual change in physical supply or demand, any 
increase in the price of oil attributable to “excess speculation” in the 
futures markets would appear to be short lived.  Indeed, absent any 
perceptible change in anticipated supply or demand, speculators who 
bid up the price of oil would be met with speculators convinced there 
is no basis for such higher prices who would just as quickly bid the 
price down. 
The problem, of course, is that not everyone may agree on the 
future course of physical supply and demand.  Thus, increases in the 
price of crude oil during the period of time that subcommittee staff 
was examining could just as easily be attributable not so much to 
“excess speculation,” however that term is defined, but to anticipated 
 
71 Id. 
72 The NYMEX futures contract for gasoline (reformulated gasoline) calls for delivery to 
New York Harbor.  The contract is based on barrels, and there are 42,000 gallons to a barrel.  
If a speculator wanted to hoard gasoline for the purpose of driving up its price, i.e., squeeze 
the market, it would first have to buy up nearby long positions in such gasoline; then, rather 
than cash settle such positions, it would take physical delivery of the product in New York 
and, rather than sell it in the ordinary course or otherwise make it available to short sellers to 
cover their positions, the speculator could thereby effectively squeeze the market.  The prob-
lem is that New York Harbor can store as much as seventy-five million barrels of gasoline.  
To corner the market would require acquiring a substantial amount of such storage.  At $3 
per gallon of gasoline, the cost to engineer a squeeze in New York Harbor would be astro-
nomical, (e.g., 42,000 x $2 x 50,000,000 barrels) before adding in the costs of storage and 
insurance.  In any event, the exercise is largely academic because NYMEX has long had po-
sition limits of its own on energy products. 
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increases in demand for oil from China, whose economy during the 
period studied was experiencing unprecedented growth.73  Obviously, 
if the market guesses wrong about a major factor such as Chinese 
demand, prices will experience volatility, but there is nothing in the 
CFTC discussion that explains how subcommittee staffers were able 
to conclude the crude oil market would move substantially up or 
down because of “excess speculation” or because of new information, 
which may bear on the future direction of prices. 
The second Congressional study cited by the CFTC, as proof 
of Congressional intent that no finding of necessity to combat “excess 
speculation” was needed, was a report by the same Congressional 
subcommittee in 2007 concerning natural gas.74  All the CFTC says 
about that study is that “Congress found similar price volatility 
stemming from excess speculation in the natural gas market.”75  In 
fact, the natural gas report dealt largely with a single hedge fund that, 
in the summer of 2006, purchased an unusually large number of natu-
ral gas futures contracts for winter delivery, and in so doing, bid up 
the price.76  However, because traders saw no fundamental change in 
expected supply or demand for natural gas, other hedge funds quickly 
realized that prices for such delivery were too high.77  Accordingly, 
they began to sell short, thus bidding the price for winter delivery 
down.78  As a result, when prices declined, the company that bet pric-
es would rise had to pay margin calls, and because the volume of 
their positions was so large, the margins calls effectively forced the 
fund out of business.79  In the meantime, prices returned fairly quick-
ly to where the market believed they should have been in the first 
place.80 
Nevertheless, based on these two subcommittee reports, the 
CFTC said Congress “had already gathered evidence regarding the 
impact of excessive speculation, and had concluded that such specu-
lation imposed an undue burden on the economy[,]” and that “[i]n 
 
73 S. REP. NO. 109-65, at 10 (2006). 
74 PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE NATURAL 
GAS MARKET. (2007), available at https://www.levin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/supporting/ 
2007/PSI.Amaranth.062507.pdf. 
75 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 12. 
76 EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE NATURAL GAS MARKET, supra note 74, at 51-52. 
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light of these investigations and conclusions, it is reasonable for the 
Commission to conclude that Congress did not intend for it to dupli-
cate investigations Congress had already conducted, and did not in-
tend to leave it up to the Commission whether there should be federal 
limits.”81 
In short, based on these two Congressional staff reports, the 
CFTC has concluded that, based on its own experience, it is reasona-
ble to interpret the Dodd Frank amendments to the CEA as not only 
mandating speculative position limits in privately negotiated swaps 
involving twenty-eight different physical commodities, but impliedly 
also reading out of the CEA entirely the otherwise unambiguous re-
quirement, dating back to 1936, that any federally imposed position 
limit must be preceded by an agency finding that “such limit is neces-
sary to prevent excessive speculation in a particular market.”82 
In addition to the Congressional staff reports, the CFTC also 
said it was relying on a 1981 CFTC rule that required United States 
futures markets to adopt “speculative position limits for ‘for each 
separate [futures] contract for which delivery months are listed to 
trade.’ ”83  The 1981 rule specified the criteria for determining how 
the required limits would be set, but did not include the antecedent 
judgment of whether to order limits at all.84  In short, the CFTC or-
dered speculative position limits to be established for all United 
States exchanged traded futures – but it did so without any showing 
of excessive speculation or other burdens on the market.85  Thus, the 
CFTC’s argument here is that because it dispensed with the 1981 
statutory prerequisite for imposing position limits, and no one at the 
time challenged the CFTC’s having done so, it is just as reasonable 
for the CFTC to dispense with the same statutory prerequisite in ex-
panding the scope of its authority to cover all privately negotiated 
swaps that effectively function like exchange-traded futures.86 
Finally, the CFTC concludes that Congress impliedly dis-
pensed with the statutory prerequisite for making contract-by-
contract findings because one of the Dodd Frank amendments re-
quires the CFTC to conduct a study of the effects, if any, of the limits 
 
81 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 12. 
82 Id. at 9. 
83 Id. at 15. 
84 Id. at 15-16. 
85 Id. at 17. 
86 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 15-16. 
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it establishes – once the limits have been in effect.87  Here, the CFTC 
argues that Congress would not have required them to conduct a se-
cond study if it wasn’t dispensing altogether with the statutory man-
date requiring a study before any position limits are imposed.88 
Of course, the CFTC’s argument still leaves open the question 
of why, if Congress was dispensing with an unambiguous statutorily-
mandated finding of necessity dating back to the 1930s, it didn’t 
come right out in Dodd Frank and say so.  Here, the CFTC argues 
that because the Dodd Frank position limits apply only to physical 
commodities (and thus exempt such things as interest rate and cur-
rency futures, which are always cash-settled and thus never settled by 
physical delivery), the statutory necessity findings are still applicable 
here – in that narrow context.89  Hence, the CFTC argues, there was 
no need for Congress to repeal the need for a necessity finding.90 
However, the CFTC did not point to any language in Dodd 
Frank’s legislative history to suggest that Congress was intending to 
do any such thing.  That brings us back to the CFTC’s overall experi-
ence as the agency charged with enforcement of the anti-
manipulation provisions of the CEA.  However, the CFTC cites noth-
ing in its experience enforcing the CEA that would support any find-
ing that Congress wanted to preserve the legislative prerequisite of a 
finding of “need” before imposing position limits for off-exchange 
futures contracts that did not require physical delivery. 
Thus, if “excessive speculation” could drive up interest rates 
and foreign currency just as easily as it could drive up the price of 
physical commodities, why then would Congress dispense with a 
finding of necessity for futures trading involving physical commodi-
ties, and not dispense with such a finding for such things as interest 
rates and foreign currency?  Absent any experience by which the 
CFTC could draw a conclusion one way or the other, it would appear 
that the CFTC’s rationale may be deemed sufficiently arbitrary so as 
not to pass legal muster. 
 
87 Id. at 18-19. 
88 Id. at 19. 
89 Id. at 19-20. 
90 Id. at 19-21. 
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IV. AS A FALL BACK, THE CFTC MAKES A “NECESSITY” 
FINDING 
Given the apparent weakness of its position, it is not surpris-
ing that the CFTC has also embraced a fallback position, i.e., it goes 
on to say in its proposed new regulations, that even if a necessity 
finding is required, “out of an abundance of caution in light of the 
district court decision,” it is now making one.91  However, the 
CFTC’s finding on that score may be just as weak as its statutory in-
terpretation. 
As indicated above, since 1936, the CEA (or its predecessor) 
has required that before speculative position limits may be imposed, 
there must first be a “finding that such limits are necessary ‘to dimin-
ish, eliminate or prevent excessive speculation causing sudden or un-
reasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the prices of’ 
commodities.”92 
Here, the Commission asserts that speculative position limits 
are “necessary as a prophylactic measure” for two reasons.93  First, 
“to lessen the likelihood that a trader will accumulate excessively 
large speculative positions that can result in corners, squeezes, or 
other forms of manipulation that cause unwarranted or unreasonable 
price fluctuations.”94  And second, they are also necessary because 
“even if not accompanied by manipulative conduct” “excessively 
large speculative positions may cause sudden or unreasonable price 
fluctuations.”95 
To support the first prong of its findings, the CFTC cites the 
1979-80 cornering of the silver market by the Hunt Brothers.96  The 
story is not new or novel.  The Hunts conspired to corner the silver 
market by buying up long silver positions, taking delivery on those 
positions and, by creating an actual shortage of physical silver in the 
market, forcing short sellers of silver to pay artificially high prices to 
close out their positions.97 
In other words, the Hunt Brothers and their co-conspirators 
did not just speculate excessively in the futures market, they altered 
 
91 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 21-22. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 22. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. (emphasis added). 
96 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 23. 
97 Id. at 23-24. 
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the fundamental rules of physical supply and demand of the underly-
ing physical commodity by hoarding silver that would otherwise have 
been available to short sellers and industrial users, thus forcing up 
prices artificially.98  When the government figured out what the 
Hunts and their co-conspirators were doing, position limits were im-
posed, thus forcing the Hunts to give up the squeeze, which caused 
prices to plummet.99 
There is no question that the Hunt Brothers and their co-
conspirators engaged in a conspiracy to artificially inflate the price of 
silver.  Their conduct was found to be a violation of not just the anti-
manipulation provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, but the 
United States antitrust laws, i.e., Section 1 of the Sherman Act.100 
But nowhere does the Commission demonstrate how position 
limits, had they been in effect in 1979 and 1980, would have worked 
to prevent the conspiracy.  The existence of position limits might 
have made it harder to manipulate the price of silver, but no one can 
demonstrate that the conspiracy would not have occurred.  At the 
heart of the Hunt conspiracy, as well as just about every other con-
spiracy, is secrecy.  What made the Hunt conspiracy work was the 
fact that the Hunts had secretly lined up confederates that they knew 
would join with them in buying up long silver positions, taking phys-
ical delivery, and squeezing the shorts.101 
Thus, had position limits been in effect, the conspirators 
would have simply evaded them, just as they tried to evade the CEA 
and the United States antitrust laws.102  The CFTC thus makes no 
demonstration in its sixteen pages of discussion that had position lim-
its been in effect, no such conspiracy would have been possible. 
Instead, the CFTC quotes a report prepared by the “staffs” of 
the CFTC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
the Department of the Treasury, and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission that “reasonable speculative position limits, [had they] 
been in place before the buildup of large positions occurred, would 
have helped prevent the accumulation of such large positions and the 
resultant dislocations created when the holders of those positions 
 
98 Id. at 25-26. 
99 Id. at 26. 
100 See Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 718 F. Supp. 168, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
101 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 25. 
102 Minpeco, 718 F. Supp. at 170. 
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stood for delivery.”103  That is, according to the CFTC “speculative 
position limits would have helped to prevent the buildup of the silver 
price spike of 1979-80.”104 
To support that conclusion, the CFTC points to the fact that 
by late 1979, when the Chicago Board of Trade imposed position 
limits and raised margin requirements, long positions had to be liqui-
dated, which resulted, not surprisingly, in the short squeeze abruptly 
coming to an end.105 
But what the CFTC nowhere tries to show is how, in the teeth 
of a secret conspiracy to fix prices, the existence of speculative posi-
tion limits would somehow act as a deterrent.  Instead, the Commis-
sion states, “if Federal speculative position limits had been in effect 
that correspond to the limits that the Commission proposes now, 
across markets now subject to Commission jurisdiction, such limits 
would have prevented the Hunt brothers and their cohorts from ac-
cumulating such large futures positions.”106  In short, the CFTC relies 
on its own ipse dixit. 
The CFTC then argues that position limits are still needed as a 
prophylactic to prevent “excessive speculation,” even in the absence 
of manipulative behavior.107  Here, the Commission relies in part on a 
staff report prepared by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on In-
vestigation,108 which in 2007 looked into the behavior of Amaranth 
Advisors LLC, the hedge fund that collapsed in September 2006 after 
building up that summer an unusually large long position in natural 
gas futures for delivery that winter,109 a CFTC enforcement action 
against Amaranth,110 and a still pending enforcement action against 
Amaranth’s former head energy trader.111 
Unlike the Hunt Brothers, Amaranth did not conspire with 
anyone; nor did it take physical delivery of any physical commodity 
in an attempt to engineer a corner or a short squeeze.  Indeed, Ama-
ranth did not engage in any manipulative behavior at all. 
 
103 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 24. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 26. 
106 Id. at 35. 
107 Id. at 22. 
108 See generally EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE NATURAL GAS MARKET, supra note 74.  
109 ACTIVITIES OF THE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, S. REP. NO. 111-360, 
at 143 (2010). 
110 Id. at 145. 
111 Id. 
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Instead, Amaranth, which could neither make nor take deliv-
ery of physical natural gas, made a very large bet in the summer of 
2006 that the spread between natural gas prices for delivery that win-
ter and summer would be far greater than usual.112 
Amaranth engaged in spread trading.  Spread trading is a trad-
ing strategy often employed in commodities where prices vary sea-
sonally.113  A spread trader bets not so much on the absolute price of 
the commodity going up in winter – everyone expects that it will go 
up in winter and down in summer – but rather on the amount of the 
actual spread between the prices in different months.  Thus, Ama-
ranth would sell short natural gas in delivery months where it be-
lieved prices would actually go lower and at the same time it would 
go long in delivery months where it believed prices would actually go 
higher.  If it guessed right in both legs of the trade, it would have a 
substantial gain. 
Amaranth’s bet in 2006 was quite large. 
During the spring and summer of 2006, Amaranth con-
trolled between 25 and 48% of the outstanding con-
tracts . . . in all NYMEX natural gas futures contracts 
for 2006; about 30% of the outstanding contracts . . . in 
all NYMEX natural gas futures contracts for 2007; be-
tween 25 and 40% of the outstanding contracts . . . in 
all NYMEX natural gas futures controls for 2008; be-
tween 20 and 40% of the outstanding contracts . . . in 
all NYMEX natural gas futures contracts for 2009; and 
about 60% of the outstanding contracts . . . in all 
NYMEX natural gas futures contracts for 2010.114 
The senate subcommittee staff found that Amaranth’s large 
positions resulted in “significant price movements in key natural gas 
futures prices and price relationships” and that they were a “predomi-
nant cause” of an increasing price spread between summer and winter 
contracts.115  In other words, the committee concluded that the huge 
concentration of ownership of open interest in natural gas futures 
contracts by Amaranth was itself the cause of prices being artificially 
 
112 Id. at 167. 
113 Adam Milton, Spread Trading, ABOUT.COM (last visited May 2, 2014), 
http://daytrading.about.com/od/stou/g/SpreadTrading.htm. 
114 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 41 n.107. 
115 S. REP. NO. 111-360, at 167 (2010). 
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inflated.116 
The CFTC then cited the senate subcommittee’s conclusion 
that “purchasers of natural gas during the summer of 2006 for deliv-
ery in the following winter months paid inflated prices due to Ama-
ranth’s speculative trading,” and that “many of these inflated costs 
were passed on to consumers, including residential users who paid 
higher home heating bills[, and that s]uch inflated costs [we]re clear-
ly a burden on interstate commerce.”117 
However, if Amaranth’s trading single-handedly caused natu-
ral gas futures prices for winter delivery to rise artificially, i.e., to a 
level not warranted by anticipated physical supply and demand, then 
it stands to reason that other traders in the market would see this as an 
opportunity to sell short an overpriced asset, and thereby quickly 
force these prices down to where they should be, with no one other 
than Amaranth getting hurt, which appears to be exactly what hap-
pened. 
Neither the senate subcommittee staffers nor the CFTC seem 
to allow for this possibility.  The subcommittee report states: 
Amaranth had held as many as 100,000 natural gas 
contracts in a single month, representing . . . 5 percent 
of the natural gas used in the entire United States in a 
year. At times Amaranth controlled 40 percent of all 
of the outstanding contacts in the NYMEX exchange 
for natural gas in the winter season (October 2006 
through March 2007), including as much as 75 percent 
of the outstanding contracts to deliver natural gas in 
November 2006.118 
The implication is that excessive amounts of futures contracts were to 
blame. 
However, there was plenty of evidence that Amaranth had 
simply made the wrong bet.  Like all commodities, the price of natu-
ral gas depends on relative supply and demand.  Heading into the 
winter season, traders look to see how much natural gas is in storage 
and whether the forecast that winter is for a cold or a mild winter.  If 
the amount of gas in storage is greater than expected, and the winter 
is predicted to be mild then prices will tend to come down because of 
 
116 Id. 
117 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 42. 
118 S. Rep. No. 111-360, at 167 (2010). 
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the expectation that supplies for the coming winter will be abundant. 
On the other hand, because most natural gas stored in the 
United States is in facilities that are prone to destruction in the event 
of a hurricane,119 the possibility of one or more bad hurricanes, com-
bined with a winter predicted to be colder than normal, would tend to 
force prices up. 
Here, Amaranth, made a large bet that natural gas prices 
would rise, and the market evidence in September 2006, when Ama-
ranth reportedly lost $6 billion on its natural gas positions, was that 
there was not only ample storage, but that forecasters were expecting 
both a mild hurricane season and a mild winter as well.  Not surpris-
ingly, hedge funds seeing that same data would conclude that natural 
gas prices for delivery that winter were too high and would look to 
enter into short positions.  Because these positions are traded on the 
NYMEX, no one has to target Amaranth as such, although it was 
probably the case that most savvy traders knew Amaranth was re-
sponsible for driving up the prices and that such increases were not 
supported by market fundamentals.  But it did not take much to drive 
the prices back down and it was the resulting margin calls necessitat-
ed by a drop in price that caused Amaranth’s collapse. 
So, what then to make of the CFTC’s conclusion that Ama-
ranth’s excessive speculation in the summer of 2006 caused purchas-
ers of natural gas to pay more for delivered natural gas that winter?  
There is certainly no evidence of that cited in the CFTC’s Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking.  And it is hard to believe there would be much 
evidence of that.  If the reports that summer had anticipated an ample 
supply of natural gas in storage, and the forecasts for the hurricane 
and winter seasons were both expected to be mild, it is difficult to be-
lieve that anyone would have had to pay more than they should have 
for delivery of natural gas that winter.  And if they did not have to 
pay more than they should have, there is no evidence that any artifi-
cially inflated costs were passed on to their customers.  Here, too, the 
CFTC cites none in its notice; nor do they cite to any such data on the 
senate staff report. 
That is not to say that there could not have been any such evi-
dence.  But the CFTC notice makes no mention of the price-
discovery effect of arbitrage, which is the process by which traders 
 
119 Simon Romero, Natural Gas: Big Worry This Winter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2005),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/15/business/15natgas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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seek price discrepancies for equivalent goods in different markets.120  
Given advances in technology, traders today can quickly detect 
whether future pricing for natural gas, or any other physical commod-
ity, is too high or too low by comparing pricing for similar products.  
Thus, for example, a natural gas trader would look at pricing for natu-
ral gas in other parts of the world, as well as prices for comparable 
products in the United States, such as heating oil, to identify pricing 
discrepancies and opportunities to profit through arbitrage.  And be-
cause of the computerized sophistication by which such trading takes 
place today, it is difficult to imagine pricing anomalies like those cre-
ated by Amaranth lasting very long.  Indeed, because Amaranth’s bet 
was so extraordinarily large and risky, it only took about a month or 
two before natural gas prices fell enough by September 2006 that 
Amaranth itself collapsed, losing $6 billion.121 
Perhaps the best example of the dubious nature of the CFTC’s 
theory of “excessive speculation” causing prices to rise is explained 
by what happened to the German firm Metallgesellschaft (“MG”).122  
In the fall of 1993, MG’s United States affiliate purchased near term 
long positions in heating oil on the NYMEX and in over-the-counter 
swaps equal to forty-three times the daily production of Kuwait.123  
No one before had ever amassed a speculative long position that 
large.124 
But MG’s speculative oil trading, as massive as it was, did not 
move oil prices higher.  This is because MG’s massive long position 
did not fundamentally alter actual physical supply or demand.  How-
ever, on Thanksgiving 1993, when OPEC oil ministers were unable 
 
120 Hiren M. Maniar, Price Discovery and Arbitrage Between Futures and Cash Markets- 
A Case Study on National Stock Exchange of India (NSE), 24 FIN. INDIA 929 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.larsentoubro.com/lntcorporate/pmiv/pdf/Journal_Paper_1.pdf. 
121 S. REP. NO. 111-360, at 166 (2010). 
122 GEOFFREY POITRAS, RISK MANAGEMENT, SPECULATION, AND DERIVATIVE SECURITIES 
58-60 (2002). 
123 Id. at 58-59. 
124 Id. at 58.  Ironically, MG took the position that its huge near-term long position was 
actually a bona fide hedge because it had entered into a series of ten-year fixed price con-
tracts for the sale of heating oil and gasoline.  However, most of those contracts did not call 
for the actual delivery of any oil products until the end of the ten-year term, and if at any 
time during that ten-year period the market price of such products exceeded the fixed price 
in the contracts, the customer could cancel the entire contract and receive a cash payment 
equal to the difference between the spike price and the fixed price times the total amount of 
product not delivered.  Because MG gave away these contracts for free, they were widely 
criticized as mere excuses to speculate, resulting in the largest speculative oil futures posi-
tion in history. 
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to agree on a quota to restrict production, which obviously did have 
an impact on anticipated supplies, near term oil prices fell by about a 
$4 a barrel, from about $19 to $15 – which was enough to cause MG 
to suffer margin calls it could not afford to meet.125 
Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible that in certain mar-
kets there might be price stickiness where, because “excessive specu-
lation” has inflated a price, other related pricing remains stuck at arti-
ficially high levels notwithstanding the existence of arbitrage.  It is 
also possible that absent manipulation and position limits, speculators 
competing with one another could themselves create a feeding frenzy, 
creating commodity bubbles where the rules of physical supply and 
demand say they should not exist, and thus creating market volatility 
which itself can be a problem. 
That would presumably be the kind of investigation and find-
ing on a market-by-market basis that the original provisions of the 
CEA intended the CFTC to make.  However, the CFTC, in its latest 
notice of proposed rulemaking, cites the senate subcommittee’s re-
port on Amaranth as proof that Congress intended to eliminate that 
requirement, which may be difficult for the CFTC to sustain in 
court.126 
And even though the CFTC does not address it, there is a 
well-recognized circumstance where aggressive trading by a single 
trader, acting alone, can in fact move markets higher.127  This occurs 
when a trader acquires a dominant position in the futures market by 
controlling at least 50% or more of both the commodity’s near term 
long positions and the actual physical commodity available for im-
mediate delivery.128 
The actual physical commodity available for immediate de-
livery is a term of art that refers to specific lots of the commodity 
stored in exchange warehouses.129  Under the terms of every futures 
contract traded in the world, the owner has the right, but not the obli-
 
125 POITRAS, supra note 122, at 60. 
126 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 43. 
127 Tatyana Shumsky, At London Metal Exchange, Mystery Buyer Holds Bulk of LME 
Copper, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748 
703865004575648934244174898. 
128 JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL MARKET 
MANIPULATION 5 (2014). 
129 CFTC Glossary, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, 
http://www.cftc.gov/consumerprotection/educationcenter/cftcglossary/index.htm (last visited 
May 2, 2014). 
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gation, to make or take delivery of that commodity.130  Most transac-
tions, however, are cash settled, which means that the holder of a 
long position will settle up his trade with the holder of a short posi-
tion.131 
Short sellers are traders holding contracts to deliver a com-
modity at a fixed price in the future, having previously “sold” the 
commodity.132  As the contract matures, the short seller must either 
match his trade with that of a long seller, and cash settle the differ-
ence in price or the short seller can purchase the physical commodity 
from someone holding the commodity in an exchange warehouse.133 
Normally, there is no problem.  But when an aggressive trader 
does what the Hunt Brothers did, i.e. buys a large number of long po-
sitions, and when contracts mature, rather than cash settling, instead 
takes physical delivery of the commodity.  And, then continues buy-
ing long positions but this time refuses to make the physical com-
modity available to short sellers, the market is being squeezed. 
When short sellers are squeezed in this fashion, the dominant 
trader is able to extract an artificially high price to close out his long 
trades.134  There is no question that such speculative trading, if al-
lowed to continue, will drive up prices artificially and thereby force 
consumers to pay higher prices.135 
But are mandatory position limits the answer? 
When a trader singlehandedly uses his market power over 
both near-dated long futures positions and ownership of the physical 
commodity to demand supra-competitive prices from short sellers, 
such conduct violates both the anti-manipulation provisions of the 
CEA and Section 2 of the Sherman Act’s provisions.136 
 
130 See generally Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, What are “Contracts of Sale of a 
Commodity for Future Delivery” Within Meaning of Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1 et seq.), 182 A.L.R. FED. 559 (2002). 
131 How Futures Work, NYSE EURONEXT, https://nyse.nyx.com/education/all-about-
investing/futures/how-futures-work (last visited May 2, 2014). 
132 Reem Heakal, Futures Fundamentals: How The Market Works, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/futures/futures2.asp (last visited May 2, 2014). 
133 William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in A Time of 
Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 917-19 (2005). 
134 Kevin A. Crisp, Giving Investors Short Shrift: How Short Sale Constraints Decrease 
Market Efficiency and A Modest Proposal for Letting More Shorts Go Naked, 8 J. BUS. & 
SEC. L. 135, 151 (2008). 
135 Bill Zielinski, Understanding How a Short Squeeze Can Cause a Stock to Soar, 
ANSWERS, http://investing.answers.com/investing-101/understanding-how-a-short-squeeze-
can-cause-a-stock-to-soar (last visited May 2, 2014). 
136 Vandenberg & Feliu LLP, Comments of Vandenberg & Feliu LLP on Proposed Rule 
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In other words, there is already a remedy for this situation.  
What is more, the CFTC already has the ability to monitor those 
holding large long positions in particular commodities as well as 
those owning physical commodities stored in exchange warehouses 
and can, if doing its job, bring legal action to enjoin traders seeking 
to squeeze the market. 
V. THE LME’S ALTERNATIVE TO POSITION LIMITS 
If the CFTC believes that there is not enough regulatory over-
sight, it might wish to take a look at what the London Metal Ex-
change (LME) does. 
The LME has no position limits, but it employs what is called 
“lending guidance” to prevent dominant traders from using their 
market power to extract “supra competitive” prices from short 
sellers.137  Under the LME’s regulatory regime, lending guidance is 
triggered whenever a trader holds 50% or more of a near term long 
position and ownership of stocks in the warehouse.138  Such traders, 
in such circumstances, are required to “lend” their physical stocks to 
short sellers at a fraction of the prevailing premium.139  The fraction 
decreases as the percentage ownership increases to the point where 
once the 90% threshold is reached, the trader must “lend” his physi-
cal stocks to short sellers without receiving any premium at all.140 
In other words, the LME’s guidelines are intended to gradual-
ly eliminate any market power a dominant trader may hope to ac-
quire. 
The LME’s lending guidelines were developed only about ten 
years ago.141  Prior to their adoption, the LME would look at pricing 
on its markets and impose limits whenever it thought there might be 
 
change To List and Trade Shares of the JPM XF Physical Copper Trust Pursuant to NYSE 
Arca Equities Rule 8.201, at 8 (May 9, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nysearca-
2012-28/nysearca201228-1.pdf. 
137 Thorsten Schier, LME chief says lending rules robust enough to prevent disruption, 
AMM (Nov. 4, 2010, 12:18 PM), http://www.amm.com/Article/2724920/LME-chief-says-
lending-rules-robust-enough-to-prevent-disruption.html. 
138 Diarmuid O'Hegarty, Lending Guidance for LME Metals, LONDON METAL EXCHANGE 




141 Id. at 1. 
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abuses taking place.142 
Specifically, the LME would monitor levels of backwarda-
tion.  Backwardation is what occurs when the near term prices for fu-
ture delivery of a commodity exceed the prices for delivery of that 
same commodity later in time.143  When a market is being squeezed, 
near term prices can rise dramatically, thus increasing the backwarda-
tion.144 
The LME’s response, when that occurred, was to impose arbi-
trary limits on the level of backwardation.145 
The problem with that arbitrary approach, however, was that 
not all backwardation results from squeezes.  Thus, backwardation 
can occur when there is a temporary disruption in supply, thus caus-
ing prices for immediate delivery of a commodity to spike.  When 
that occurs, holders of long positions stand to profit, of course, but 
such profit-making is not only legitimate, but the near-term higher 
prices will, at least in theory, encourage producers to make more of 
the commodity in order to satisfy the near-term demand.  The result 
is that supply and demand will eventually be back in balance.  The 
problem with the LME’s approach was that arbitrarily limiting the 
backwardation, absent proof of a squeeze, could undermine the nor-
mal forces of supply and demand that would incentivize production 
of more supply. 
Hence, the LME came up with the idea of its lending guide-
lines.146 
The LME has made clear that it believes its lending guidelines 
offer a much better approach than position limits.147  However, the 
 
142 WIKIPEDIANS, DERIVATIVES 153. 
143 Id. 
144 Backwardation, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/backwardation.asp 
(last visited May 2, 2014). 
145 O'Hegarty, supra note 138, at 2. 
146 Id. at 1. 
147 Id. at 2.  The LME’s lending guidance is not without its own flaws, though.  Thus, for 
example, as LME warehouse stocks decline, the LME becomes more and more vulnerable to 
a squeeze, as it takes much less metal to squeeze the market.  Furthermore, not all metal ca-
pable of immediate delivery to satisfy a short position, and thus avoid a squeeze, may be 
found in LME warehouses, which tend to charge substantially higher rental storage costs 
than non-LME warehouses.  If LME-grade metal is stored in lower cost non-LME ware-
houses, e.g., at a smelter’s storage facilities, such metal may be used to squeeze the market 
and, because such metal outside of LME warehouses is not counted in determining LME 
lending guidance, traders who accumulate such metal in these locations can, at least in theo-
ry, successfully squeeze the market.  The only practical limit at present on such conduct is 
the cost. 
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LME is not about to criticize the CFTC for insisting instead on posi-
tion limits. 
One reason may be that the LME competes with United States 
exchanges in the sale of metals and the prospect of mandatory posi-
tion limits for United States exchanges may put the United States ex-
changes at a competitive disadvantage. 
The reason is that once the United States mandates position 
limits for speculators, the United States must simultaneously get into 
the business of regulating exemptions from such limits for so-called 
bona fide hedgers. 
In the old days, hedgers were anyone actually engaged in the 
physical commodity business that was seeking to shift a price risk.  
All a hedger had to do to show that it was entitled to an exemption 
from position limits was produce a copy of a contract requiring it to 
make or take physical delivery of a commodity.148 
Today, however, it is not so easy to identify who is hedging.  
Indeed, many traders operate physical trading businesses, but because 
of the complex algorithmic way in which certain hedging schemes 
are implemented, it can sometimes be impossible for traders to match 
their futures trading, lot-for-lot, with their actual physical trading.  
Thus, for example, a merchant in the energy business may decide to 
hedge its obligations to deliver United States heating oil by purchas-
ing European gasoil; or the same merchant may feel that its risks are 
best hedged by purchasing a crack spread, which may be a short or 
long-dated long contract for West Texas Intermediate Oil and a short 
or long-dated short contract for No. 2 heating oil. 
In other words, there are many different ways in which a party 
may decide to hedge and a regulatory regime which imposes position 
limits, but provides hedge exemptions, must be able to differentiate 
between legitimate hedges and subterfuges designed to speculate. 
Once again, MG offers a case in point.  Back in 1993, the 
NYMEX had position limits for speculators.149  MG, however, want-
ed to be exempt from such limits on the ground it was “hedging.”  
The purported basis for its hedge exemption was its having entered 
into ten-year contracts with consumers to sell gasoline and heating oil 
at fixed prices, but under terms by which the consumers did not have 
 
148 Position Limits for Derivatives, supra note 1, at 195. 
149 Dan M. Berkovitz, Background on Position Limits and the Hedge Exemption, 
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 5  (Jan. 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/proposedrule011410_berkovitz. 
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to take any delivery until thirty days prior to expiration of the ten-
year term.150 
In the meantime, if at any time during the ten year period the 
price of gasoline or heating oil exceeded the fixed price in the con-
tract, the consumer could sell back the contract and receive the dif-
ference between the actual price and the fixed price, multiplied by the 
total amount of gallons that otherwise would be delivered.  Consum-
ers paid nothing for these “contracts,” but MG used them to obtain 
hedge exemptions entitling them to be excused from position limits 
intended to curb speculation.151  That these contracts were mere pre-
texts by which MG was allowed to engineer one of the biggest oil 
speculations in history went unnoticed by NYMEX, which unwitting-
ly blessed these exemptions.152 
The problem, in other words, is that once you impose position 
limits, you must also allow for hedge exemptions and it is difficult to 
imagine how the government could administer such a regime without 
either erring on the side of granting such exemptions in almost every 
case, not wishing to second-guess a company’s hedging strategy or, 
alternatively, the government refuses to grant the exemption, in 
which case a legitimate price risk may not be capable of being shift-
ed.  If that occurs, there is the very real prospect that consumers will 
have to pay higher prices to compensate the seller for the risk it could 
not hedge that prices might rise, or, alternatively, as suggested earlier, 
a new market emerges in which hedge exemptions themselves are 
bought and sold, and such costs are likewise passed on to consumers 
Yet the CFTC insists that position limits are the answer.  It 
has promulgated a rule change, for the second time, hoping that it has 
addressed the concerns raised by the court that struck down its posi-
tion limits proposal last year, and given the controversy raised by the 
proposal, it is virtually certain that the revised rules will again be 
challenged legally and the CFTC will have to justify why it believes 
it is legally entitled to mandate position limits in the absence of any 
empirical evidence demonstrating that they are either necessary or 
appropriate to address any real problem in the futures markets.  How-
 
150 MARK WAHRENBURG, HEDGING OIL PRICE RISK: LESSONS FROM METALLGESELLSCHAFT 
3 (1995). 
151 Edward N. Krapels, Re-examining the Metallgesellschaft affair and its implication for 
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ever, it may be time to take a closer look at whether such regulation 
is really needed and whether there are other more surgical remedies 
that the CFTC may wish to consider implementing instead. 
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